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Abstract
An ongoing debate on the purpose of  local self-government in Ice-
land has been simmering mainly between those who believe that lo-
cal authorities should amalgamate in order to assume more respon-
sibilities and those who believe that local autonomy, understood as 
the right of  citizens to govern their own jurisdictions, should not be 
weakened. The purpose of  this study is to discuss the role of  local 
self-government in Iceland from these two very different perspec-
tives by situating it within the context of  the Nordic model of  local 
self-government. This study’s findings reveal that the Icelandic cen-
tral government has successfully introduced functional reforms at the 
local level over the past 25 years, but it has not been as successful 
in initiating territorial reforms. The findings also show that conflict 
between the ideologies of  the traditional autonomous model and the 
more modern model of  integration is growing. 
Keywords: Amalgamation; integration; autonomy; path depend-
ency; local self-government.
Introduction
The existing literature on local government typically places all Nordic countries under 
the Nordic model.1 Traditionally, the Nordic model is epitomised by relatively small local 
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governments and a high concentration of  local government control over service deliv-
ery, which, in some cases, predates World War II. There are fundamental differences 
between the Nordic model and models based on the Napoleonic system that rely heavily 
on administrative centralisation with strong central oversight over local elites who reside 
in small municipalities with limited responsibilities. However, local politicians are often 
not only influential on the local level but also on the national level (Goldsmith 2010; 
Sellers & Lidström 2007). Furthermore, a heavy emphasis on welfare service delivery 
has led to high levels of  professional local bureaucracy (Goldsmith & Larsen 2004). 
Correspondingly, issues such as economic competitiveness or regional development at-
tract less attention at the local level. Politics at the local level is based on consensus, 
which Goldsmith and Larsen (2004) assert is associated with a ‘strong corporatist tradi-
tion in decision-making at both national and local levels’ (p. 123). They argue that this 
tradition is manifested in a lack of  strong political leadership. Thus, local leadership 
entails collective, not individual, actions. Consequently, local leaders in the Nordic model 
are less likely to have a strong territorial role than French local leaders, for example. This 
situation is summed up nicely by Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014, 18): ‘[Nordic] coun-
tries possess a highly decentralised administrative structure, with, by tradition, politically 
and functionally strong local governments’. This high level of  autonomy is further con-
firmed in the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) in which (unlike the above research findings) 
Iceland is also included (Ladner, Keuffer & Baldersheim 2015).
The Nordic local government model is basically an ideal type, which means that with-
in the model there is room for considerable country-specific differences. Nevertheless, a 
functionally strong local government is seen as a prerequisite to belonging to the Nordic 
model (Rose & Ståhlberg 2005). As Iceland shares both historical and cultural roots with 
the other Nordic countries, Icelandic local government should be an integral part of  the 
Nordic model. However, there are reasons to believe that the traditions of  Icelandic local 
government do not fit the ideal of  the Nordic model. First, Icelandic local government is 
not as functionally robust as the local governments of  its Nordic counterparts (Kristins-
son 2001), and second, in Iceland, local leadership has more unique features that often 
play a strong territorial and representative role in government (Hlynsdóttir 2016b). These 
differences are especially apparent in the Icelandic debate on local self-government, 
which is embedded in the rhetoric of  large and functionally strong local governments 
versus small and democratically autonomous local authorities (Eythórsson 2014). 
This paper explores the development of  the debate over the purpose of  Icelandic lo-
cal self-government by using historical institutionalism as the analytical framework. The 
aim is twofold: first, to describe the historical development and traditions of  Icelandic 
local self-government, and second, to identify possible explanations for the Icelandic 
local system’s deviation from the Nordic model.  
1. Exploring local self-government and reform
Reforms of  local government have been on the agenda across Europe continuously 
since the early 1990s. The intensity and importance of  the debate have risen and fallen 
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during this time but have never quite vanished (Vetter & Kersting 2003). Various types 
of  reforms may be identified, although they all draw upon at least one of  the three core 
values of  local self-government: autonomy, democracy and efficiency (Sharpe 1970). 
Vetter and Kersting (2003) suggest that reforms may be organised into four types: ter-
ritorial and/or functional reforms, management reforms, participatory reforms and re-
forms to representative democracy (p. 15). The main focus of  this paper is on issues in 
relation to the first type of  reform: territorial and/or functional reforms. Kuhlmann and 
Wollmann (2014) further subdivide this category to distinguish between functional and 
territorial profiles. However, they recognise that there is a close relationship between the 
two. Often, these two reform types are considered as almost interchangeable, although 
territorial reform is usually seen as a prerequisite to functional reform. This view empha-
sises the notion that to be able to decentralise or assign tasks on the local government 
level, local government needs a certain level of  capacity that is usually achieved through 
extensive amalgamation. The emphasis on the relationship between size and local de-
mocracy may partly be traced back to Dahl and Tufte’s (1973) seminal work, Size and 
Democracy, as well as to the work of  Sharpe (1970) and Newton (1982) on the relation-
ship between size, effectiveness and democracy. 
The approach emphasising efficiency is often referred to as the consolidation per-
spective, an adversary of  the public choice perspective (Baldersheim & Rose 2010, 8). 
The former emphasises creating larger governing units that can supposedly take advan-
tage of  scale in providing services, thereby offering greater governance capacity and 
being altogether more capable of  responding to citizens’ needs. Conversely, the public 
choice approach stresses small local authorities and the democratic accessibility that 
smallness ensures for citizens (Keating 1995). Baldersheim and Rose (2010) also assert 
that the former highlights production efficiency, while the latter stresses allocation ef-
ficiency. 
Kjellberg (1985, 1995) states that whichever approach gets the upper hand must ob-
serve certain ideological traditions. He identified two different models: the autonomous 
model and the integrational model. Under the autonomous model, central and local 
government belong to different domains of  government. Although the role of  local 
government is to preserve core values of  liberty, democratic participation and efficiency, 
it functions more or less independently from the central government. The integrational 
model, however, regards the core task of  local government to be the implementation of  
national policies, thereby advocating for a centralised government. Kjellberg also sug-
gests that the integrational model is more in line with modern organisation of  welfare 
services at the local level. 
Identifying patterns of  conflict is another method of  evaluating reforms in which 
centre–periphery cleavage is a major source of  political conflict over territorial reforms 
(Baldersheim & Rose 2010, 15; Valen, Narud & Harðarson 2000, 109–110) as local 
elites battle national elites. Another source of  possible conflict is the urban–rural divide 
(Baldersheim & Rose 2010a; Sandberg 2010). Its importance varies considerably accord-
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ages have proven to be highly relevant in explaining the presence of  political conflict 
(Hlynsdóttir & Önnudóttir forthcoming). 
When it comes to explaining the development of  local government reforms, this 
study relies on historical institutionalism, which draws on the idea that policy choices 
initially made when an institution or a policy programme is created will have a lasting 
influence on the institution or policy in the future. This introduces the concept of  ‘path 
dependency’, i.e. once a government programme gets on track, there is a strong ten-
dency for the initial policy choices to persist long after the programme’s commencement 
(Peters 2012, 70). Approaches to path dependency vary, but Thelen (1999) argues that 
path dependency includes elements that concern not only continuity, but also organised 
change. Therefore, ‘institutional arrangements cannot be understood in isolation from 
the political and social setting in which they are embedded’ (Thelen 1999, 384).
Although widely applied in political science (e.g. Kuhlmann & Wollmann 2014; 
Baldersheim & Rose 2010), historical institutionalism is often suspected of  struggling to 
explain institutional change. This has been addressed by various political scientists and 
sociologists. Consequently, there is considerable variance in how change is explained 
within the approach. On the one hand, some researchers perceive change as an evolu-
tion taking place incrementally, such as Hay’s (2002) ‘punctuated evolution’ (p.163) or 
Pierson’s (2003) ‘slow-moving causal processes’ (p.181). On the other hand, there are 
those who believe changes happen in a more radical and disruptive manner. These ap-
proaches include the ‘formative moments’ introduced by Rothstein (1998), the concept 
of  ‘critical junctures’ from Collier and Collier (1991), Krasner’s (1984) ‘punctuated equi-
libriums’ and the idea of  ‘policy windows’ promoted by Kingdon (2003).2 Following the 
example of  other studies that use historical institutionalism to explain territorial and 
administrative reforms (Baldersheim & Rose 2010a; Kuhlmann & Wollmann 2014), this 
paper applies Kingdon’s (2003) policy window approach to describe changes in path de-
pendency. The policy window can be summed up in the three streams of  governmental 
process—problems, policies and political streams—coming together at a critical time 
and resulting in a policy opportunity surfacing. Kingdon explains that the opening of  
a policy window affects the decision-making agenda, which may or may not result in a 
decision being made within the government process.  
2. Setting the scene: Local self-government in Iceland
There are two levels of  government in Iceland—national and local—spread over 74 
municipalities. Additionally, there are eight regional associations (Landshlutasamtök) that 
seem to function more as an inter-municipal cooperation scheme (IMC) than as a third 
level of  government. Local self-government is protected under the 78th Article of  the 
Icelandic Constitution but without independent power to levy taxes. The foundation of  
the Local Government Act no. 138/2011 centres around the idea that all local govern-
ments are assigned the same tasks. Based on the rule of  negative delimitation of  power 
(Baldersheim, Rose & Sandberg 2017), the general precept is that local government is 
permitted to take on any task that is not forbidden by law or assigned to other bod-
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ies by law (Valsson 2014). This gives local authorities significant room to manoeuvre. 
Furthermore, task allocation between Icelandic central and local governments has long 
been known as notoriously complicated (Kristinsson 2001). Tasks that have been as-
signed to the local level include aspects of  social services, such as financial assistance, 
housing and disability services, and education, including preschools, childcare and pri-
mary schools. They bear sole responsibility in the areas of  planning, land use, building 
permits, sewerage and disaster management, among others. They are also responsible 
for public transportation through regional associations. This incomplete list provides 
an overview of  the multitude of  tasks that local authorities must manage on a daily 
basis. Of  these tasks, education has proven to be the costliest, swallowing up roughly 50 
percent of  the average municipality’s revenue. Disability services have also proven to be 
very costly, although they are supposed to be covered by earmarked government grants. 
However, grants have been criticised for being underfunded (Freysteinsdóttir & Jónsson 
2016). The main funding for local government comes from its share of  the income tax 
(60 percent), followed by property taxes (12 percent). The equalisation fund is also an 
important funding source (8 percent), and for very small municipalities it constitutes a 
major source of  income. The final revenue stream is through income on various services 
(19 percent). These are average numbers and may vary among municipalities.
With a population of  roughly 340,000, Iceland’s population is only a fraction of  that 
of  other Nordic nations. As the island is vast, this also means that population density 
is extremely low, with an average of  3.3 citizens per square kilometre. This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that roughly 65 percent of  the population lives in Reykjavík, the 
capital city, and its suburbs. If  this is extended up to a 70 km radius, then 77 percent 
of  the population lives within an hour’s drive from Reykjavík city centre. Furthermore, 
beyond a 100 km radius of  Reykjavík there is only one major town with more than 5,000 
residents: Akureyri, in North Iceland, with its population of  roughly 18,000. The rest 
of  the country is divided unequally between rural farmland and tiny villages and towns. 
Although the capital region is relatively large when compared to both other parts of  the 
country and other Nordic countries as well, the Icelandic scenario is an extreme version 
of  this trend. 
The unequal distribution of  people affects local governments. The 743 municipalities 
in Iceland average 4,533 residents each, but if  Reykjavík is excluded, the average drops 
to 2,912. The most comparable Nordic country in this regard is Norway, with an average 
of  11,000 residents per municipality. Iceland is more like Norway and Finland when it 
comes to its tradition of  having very small municipalities. Nevertheless, the proportion 
of  municipalities with fewer than 5,000 residents is much higher in Iceland than in Nor-
way and Finland (each at roughly 50 percent), as only nine of  Iceland’s 74 municipali-
ties are home to more than 5,000 residents. Overall, Icelandic councils are also smaller 
than their Nordic counterparts, ranging from 5–15 members each, with two-thirds of  
the nation’s councils having from five to seven members. Political parties affiliated with 
national parties are present in most of  the councils with more than seven members but 
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Finally, Icelandic local governments’ share of  the total public expenditure is consid-
erably lower than it is in other Nordic countries, at roughly 30 percent. In the other Nor-
dic countries, it is considerably higher (Baldersheim et. al. 2017). Furthermore, roughly 
12 percent of  the workforce is employed by local governments, (K. Björnsson 2014) 
compared to 20 percent in Norway and 25 percent in Sweden (Blom-Hansen, Borge & 
Dahlberg 2010). 
Consequently, Iceland’s welfare system has developed differently, as local authorities 
are less involved in providing services than they are in other Nordic nations both when 
it comes to the overall share of  public expenditure and percentage of  the countries 
workforce.
 
3. History of local self-government in Iceland
Early years
Icelandic municipalities can trace their origins to at least as far back as the 13th cen-
tury. Although the current structure of  the local government system was created in 
1872, it did nothing to disrupt the old geographical boundaries. Based on the Danish 
Local Government Act, the changes initiated in 1872 were mainly aimed at the inter-
nal structure of  local government. Like the Danish approach, it introduced a three-tier 
system of  towns, municipalities and districts (sýslur) on one level; regions (amt) on the 
second level (Blom-Hansen 2012); and central government on the third. The second 
tier was abolished in 1904; since then, the system has had a municipal level (consisting 
of  towns, municipalities and districts) and a central government level. The 1872 Local 
Government Act established the council–committee model with a monistic structure 
(Wollmann 2004) as the basis for the Icelandic local government system. As the Danish 
Local Government Act had been designed in such a way that there were separate acts 
for each town and one collective act for all the other municipalities, the Icelandic Act 
was drafted in the same manner. Therefore, different rules applied to towns (in this case 
only Reykjavík in the beginning) and rural areas or small villages. In each town, the of-
fice of  executive mayor or council manager was developed, while in municipalities, the 
council leader (oddviti) was simultaneously the political leader and municipal manager. 
Furthermore, like in the Danish market town system (Blom-Hansen 2012), mayors in 
towns were originally appointed by the central government. This was practised well 
into the 20th century in Iceland, with the last town to have a centrally appointed mayor 
eliminating the system in 1938. 
In rural areas, the 1872 system (Tilskipun um sveitarstjórn á Íslandi) introduced councils 
usually consisting of  three to five members and the voting system was personal or direct. 
The individual with the highest number of  votes in local elections usually became leader 
of  the council. This individual then led council meetings and handled the day-to-day 
management of  the municipality. These individuals often stayed in office for a long 
time, becoming something of  a local king (hreppakóngar). In the early 1990s, most local 
council elections used this system. During the 2010–2014 election terms, 18 municipali-
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ties were still using the personal voting election system (Statistics Iceland 2015), with 
12 council leaders who were managing local governments having been elected based 
on this old tradition. A new law, 138/2011, changed this system slightly, with council 
leaders elected via personal voting no longer automatically becoming de facto managers 
of  the local authority. 
Article 78 in the Icelandic Constitution was already part of  the first constitution 
introduced in 1874. The constitution was based on the Danish Constitution (da. grund-
loven) of  1849, which was based on the Belgian Constitution of  1830 (Sigurðsson 
2000). Originally, the ideological foundation of  these laws was to provide local elites 
with mechanisms to protect them from interference from the king’s officials. Valsson 
(2014) asserts that based on the origins of  the Icelandic constitution, article 78 provides 
democratically elected councils with the right to a certain level of  independence. Fur-
thermore, it also leads to the conclusion that democratically elected councils have the 
right to govern without interference from the central government. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. The first is that the 
local government system retained strong traits from the Napoleonic system well into 
the 20th century. The second is that the origins and heritage of  local autonomy place 
the central–local relationship structure clearly within the autonomous model (Kjellberg 
1985, 1995). As will be discussed later, this has had a lasting impact on the development 
of  local government in Iceland. 
Urban–rural divide and centre–periphery cleavage
It is possible to argue that there are two clear cleavages in Iceland: the centre–periphery 
cleavage and the urban–rural divide. Although closely linked, they are not fully aligned. 
Compared with other Nordic countries, urbanisation was slow to develop in Iceland. 
At the beginning of  the 20th century, the vast majority of  the population lived on rural 
farmland. Towns that did exist consisted of  only a few hundred or a few thousand in-
dividuals. Reykjavík had a population of  only 6,000 residents in the early 20th century. 
The conservative farming population was sceptical of  urbanisation, viewing their rural 
traditions as incompatible with it. It may be argued that certain aspects of  the Local 
Government Act of  1872 helped further differentiate between rural and town commu-
nities. The Danish tradition of  distinguishing market towns from more rural areas had a 
long-lasting effect on the development of  local Icelandic governments. Although towns 
and municipalities were viewed as autonomous entities, unlike the towns, the municipali-
ties were not entirely independent. A group of  municipalities that was usually based on 
districts was assigned to an inter-municipal district committee (sýslunefnd). The district 
committee was a semi-regional entity responsible for various shared services, e.g. rural 
road infrastructure or organised sheep herding. Furthermore, the district committee 
was also responsible for municipal finances, which meant that the municipalities were 
interdependent. 
In his seminal work on local government, L. Björnsson (1972) identified the inter-
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and villages fought hard to win town rights during the early and middle 20th century. As 
the fishing villages began to expand, they wanted money to invest in their infrastructure, 
but to obtain bank loans, their neighbouring municipalities within the district committee 
needed to approve their financial schemes. Many of  the more rural and conservative 
areas found it difficult to accept such risky financial plans. This led to the tradition of  
a clear demarcation between urban and rural settlements. In Denmark, the distinction 
between town and rural municipalities was completely removed in 1970 (Blom-Hansen 
2012). In the Icelandic context, the distinction was partly removed in the 1960s, but it 
did not completely vanish until the Local Government Act of  1986 (no. 8/1986) as the 
last traces of  district committees were abolished. 
In the early 1950s, there were 229 municipalities and towns in Iceland. In addition to 
the establishment of  numerous urban settlements, mainly by the seaside, the landscape 
at the local level changed dramatically as people flocked from the rural countryside to 
the capital region. At the same time, the election system was skewed in favour of  the 
periphery, as a disproportionate number of  voters led to peripheral constituencies hav-
ing more parliamentarians than constituencies around Reykjavik. This gave political par-
ties with strongholds in the periphery, such as the Progressive Party (farmers’ party), a 
disproportionately large role in government. Although the last reforms of  the electoral 
voting system made some substantial changes, the periphery constituencies continue 
to have disproportionally large representation in parliament. Furthermore, the system 
was steeped in favouritism, and parliamentarians from the periphery in particular were 
accused of  being exceptionally capable of  bringing favours and goods to their own 
constituencies (Kristinsson 2015). In some ways, this established a system of  distrust 
in which the periphery accused the centre of  bullying and arrogance, and in return, the 
centre accused the periphery of  being backward and pig-headed. Recently, such rhetoric 
has been apparent in public debates (see, for example, newspaper articles from Atlason 
2008 & Birkisson 2018). 
Similar differences between more rural areas and main hubs of  politics and business 
are visible in the other Nordic countries, especially Norway and Finland. However, where-
as the periphery in Finland seems to be losing power (Sandberg 2010), the Norwegian pe-
riphery remains steadfast (Baldersheim & Rose 2010b). The Norwegian electoral system 
is similar to Iceland’s, as the rural north has a proportionally larger presence in parliament 
than the Oslo area (Baldersheim & Rose 2011; Guðmundsson & Eythórsson 2013). 
Stagnation at the local level
In 1943, a journal article was published on the issue of  local government. In it, concerns 
were raised on the number and size of  municipalities in relation to their tasks (Guð-
mundsson 1943). Similar concerns were voiced in other articles over the following years. 
The main arguments in these articles were based on the idea of  efficiency, i.e. that there 
were too many small municipalities that were unable to take on more responsibility in 
the development of  the welfare state (Eythórsson 2014). These ideas were influenced by 
the similar concerns that were being voiced in other Nordic countries around the middle 
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of  the century. However, unlike in other Nordic countries, where this momentum was 
used to substantially reduce the number of  municipalities (Baldersheim & Rose 2010b; 
Lidström 2010; Mouritzen 2010; Sandberg 2010), not much happened at the local level 
in Iceland. In the decades to come, the issue of  local government reform surfaced from 
time to time without much changing. For example, in the 40 years between 1950 and 
1990, the number of  municipalities dropped by only 25, from 229 to 204, of  which 13 
were amalgamated in 1990. 
Mouritzen (2010) describes how, during this same period, Danish local administra-
tion was professionalised by more university graduates entering the upper ranks of  local 
bureaucracy. The trend helped create a break between politics and administration. Fur-
thermore, Mouritzen points out that during this period the Danish system continued on 
its path to decentralisation and increased the role of  local government in the provision 
of  social services. The situation in Iceland during that time was radically different—it 
witnessed a period of  stagnation that had an interesting side effect on the development 
of  Icelandic local administration and governance. As towns were responsible for the 
streets, sewerage and waste management within their jurisdictions, most of  them had 
developed a certain level of  administrative capacity by the early 1990s. Their govern-
ments were capable of  taking on more responsibility and expanding their capacity more 
efficiently than rural municipalities. This resulted in a double system. By the early 1990s, 
most rural municipalities had no visible administration—instead, their main adminis-
trator was a part-time council leader and a part-time clerk. There were no preschools, 
no rubbish collection, very few social services and no infrastructure, etc. (Hlynsdóttir 
2015). Furthermore, most tasks that local authorities took on were not legally assigned 
to them but were taken on voluntarily. Therefore, the role of  local leaders was often 
entrepreneurial (Hlynsdóttir 2016b) rather than that of  someone merely overseeing 
and evaluating services and service provisions. This is clearly demonstrated in the fact 
that local government share of  the total public expenditures in Iceland in the early 
1990s were roughly 20 percent, while they were closer to 60 percent in the other Nordic 
countries (Eythórsson 1999). Nevertheless, as the discussion above shows, other Nordic 
countries’ local governments were much better equipped to take on new tasks when 
the welfare state began to emerge (Sellers & Lidström 2007) than local governments in 
Iceland. However, the 1990s ushered in new ideas and new approaches at the Icelandic 
local government level. 
4. Modern Icelandic local government
In neighbouring countries and throughout the Western world, there was a strong trend 
toward government reorganisation during the 1980s (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). The 
period since 1991 in particular may be viewed as one of  constant change at the Icelandic 
local government level. New ideas, which later became known collectively as the new 
public management, were also influencing how Icelandic central government viewed the 
role of  government. In 1991, a coalition government of  the Independence Party and the 
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tir had a clear agenda to promote decentralisation at the local level (Eythórsson 1998). 
The initial idea was to follow the 1970 Danish example in which municipalities were 
amalgamated first and tasks were decentralised later (Mouritzen 2010). The plan was 
to initiate large-scale territorial reform in 1993. The aim was to reduce the number of  
municipalities to 43 (Eythórsson 2014). Although the initiative was based on the same 
premise as the Danish approach, in that citizens and local leaders were informed of  
the benefits of  amalgamation (Mouritzen 2010), there was one major difference. Given 
the tradition of  local autonomy in Iceland, the Local Government Act of  1986 (Lög um 
sveitarstjórnir 8/1986) stipulated that citizens must be allowed to vote on the amalgama-
tion processes. Additionally, for the mergers to go forward in each existing municipality, 
voter majorities were required to approve them. In the end, the initiative failed. Only one 
new municipality emerged directly out of  the initiative, although other amalgamations 
followed at later stages (Eythórsson 2014). 
A second top-down initiative on behalf  of  the central government (Independence 
Party–Progressive Party coalition) was introduced by the Progressive Party’s minister of  
local government in 2005 as amalgamation referendums were held in 66 municipalities. 
The plan was to cut the number of  municipalities down to 56. Again, the initiative was 
only partly successful. Only one new municipality emerged directly from the initiative, 
but like before, several others followed in its aftermath (Eythórsson 2014). In hindsight, 
neither of  these results is surprising as large-scale and top-down-driven amalgamations 
have usually failed when local referendums have been used to decide the fate of  the 
amalgamation (Kuhlmann & Wollmann 2014). 
Askim, Klausen, Vabo and Bjurstrom (2016, 60) state that there are several driving 
factors behind amalgamation reforms, such as fiscal stress, urbanisation, decentralisa-
tion and recent amalgamation reforms. As for decentralisation, one of  the main argu-
ments for the 1993 amalgamation initiative was the idea that large-scale amalgamations 
were necessary before any meaningful functional reforms could take place (Eythórsson 
2014). In the Nordic context, this approach was applied in all instances of  success-
ful reform. First, territorial reforms take place, then functional reforms follow in their 
wake (Baldersheim & Rose 2010b; Lidström 2010; Mouritzen 2010; Sandberg 2010). 
In the case of  Iceland, the reverse was true. Instead of  cancelling proposed functional 
reforms, the government decided to embrace the opportunity they presented and push 
forward. New laws on social services had already been introduced in 1991 (no. 40/1991) 
which defined local government responsibilities in the area of  social services in more 
detail. In 1996, the government began to delegate education through primary schools 
(no. 66/1995) and expanded local-level responsibilities in the area of  planning and land 
use in 1998 (no. 73/1997). Furthermore, fundamental changes were made during this 
period to the overall structure of  public administration with the introduction of  the Ad-
ministrative Law in 1994 (no. 37/1993) and the Information Act in 1996 (no. 50/1996). 
These acts had a significant effect on local administration as they required a level of  
administrative professionalism that went beyond what most local authorities were able 
to provide at the time. 
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The most widely and rapidly felt change was the 1996 allocation of  responsibilities 
for administering primary schools at the local level. This change is believed to have been 
the primary reason for the bottom-up territorial changes that took place (Hlynsdóttir 
2002). Before the start of  the amalgamation initiative in 1993, there were 196 munici-
palities in Iceland—a number that shrank to 124 in 2000 and to 79 by 2006. It may be 
argued that the first waves of  amalgamation in 1994 (following the 1993 initiative) and 
1998 were an immediate response to the changes in the school system. The second 
waves in 2002 and 2006 had somewhat different features from the previous waves, as 
in several cases amalgamations were being made with municipalities that had already 
amalgamated during the first wave. This is in line with the argument that once the status 
quo of  an organisation is disrupted, it takes time to stabilise again, which opens up the 
possibility for repeated amalgamations of  the same municipality (Askim et al. 2016).  
In the decade since 2006, very little has happened regarding territorial changes and 
local authorities have directed their energies towards stabilising already-merged munici-
palities. Problems that have come up in relation to service provisions have been resolved 
through inter-municipal cooperation. This has led to an increase in various types of  par-
ticipatory schemes, and a recent survey estimates that local authorities participate in at 
least 300 inter-municipal cooperation schemes of  various types and levels (Jóhannesson, 
Jóhannesson & Eythórsson 2016). In the area of  functional reforms, one major change 
occurred when the task of  disability service was delegated to the local level in January 
2012. As the provision of  this service is both costly and complicated, it was stipulated 
in the law that municipalities must represent a service area of  at least 8,000 residents. 
Furthermore, the local authorities took on the task of  public transportation during this 
period, which is organised through regional associations. 
The final issue that could be expected to influence territorial and functional reforms 
is the fiscal stress (Askim et al. 2016) following the financial crisis in 2008 that struck 
a heavy blow on many municipalities, although it seems that small rural municipalities 
escaped the crisis relatively unscathed. However, many of  the larger and (before 2008) 
more booming towns absorbed significant financial losses (Kristinsson 2014). Never-
theless, only one amalgamation was a direct consequence of  the crisis with the munici-
pality of  Álftanes merging with the town of  Garðabær in 2012. Traditionally, Icelandic 
local authorities have enjoyed a significant degree of  fiscal autonomy, especially in their 
spending and borrowing activities. One of  the responses to the financial problems that 
many municipalities found themselves in after the crisis was to impose stricter fiscal 
regulations under the new Local Government Act of  2011. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that since the early 1990s, Icelandic local authorities have 
been on the fast track to becoming more like those in other Nordic countries in terms of  
their functional responsibilities. Although top-down amalgamation initiatives have not 
been successful, functional reforms have been a success, bringing with them territorial 
reforms that have been initiated from the bottom up. However, functional reforms have 
shed light on structural weaknesses at the local level. Administrative capacity is still un-
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such as planning and land use, and many local leaders find these tasks difficult to tackle 
(Hlynsdóttir 2016a). Many local authorities also rely on a small number of  core staff  
with a low degree of  specialisation. In such cases, the council manager is often expected 
to compensate for the lack of  administrative capacity (Hlynsdóttir 2016b). Furthermore, 
many local authorities are financially strapped because of  high salary costs in the areas 
of  education and disability services, as both functions require a large amount of  staff. 
This, along with complications in relation to the number of  IMCs and increased num-
bers of  local government tasks, seems to be leading to a renewed interest in amalgama-
tion among local governments. As a result, the overall number of  Icelandic municipali-
ties will be dropping down to 72 following the local elections in May 2018.
5. The path dependency of Icelandic local government 
The major overhaul of  the local government system after the Local Government Act 
of  1872 helped establish a new trend in the Icelandic local government system, and the 
changes were clearly ideologically influenced by the autonomous model (Kjellberg 1985, 
1995). Consequently, in the 1950s an arrangement of  highly autonomous local authori-
ties was established in a system through which political conflict was based on centre–pe-
riphery cleavages on the one hand and urban–rural divides on the other. 
Figure 1 shows the intersection of  the two main sources of  political conflict as well 
as the number of  municipalities found within each quarter today. In the centre, which 
covers the immediate area of  Reykjavík and its neighbouring cities, there are six cities 
and one small rural municipality on the outskirts of  the area. Despite only accounting 
for a fraction of  the country’s municipalities, roughly 64 percent of  Iceland’s popula-
tion lives in this area. The remainder of  the country, or what here is referred to as the 
periphery,4 lies below the horizontal axis, accounting for 67 of  the 74 municipalities 
(present in Iceland as of  January 2018) but representing only 36 percent of  the popu-
lation. The minimum threshold to be identified as urban in this study is to be a town 
with at least 500 residents,5 which means there are several fairly large municipalities that 
fall into this rural-periphery group, as their population density is too low to be urban. 
Furthermore, the group of  urban-periphery municipalities covers 32 percent of  the 
population and 43 percent of  the overall number of  municipalities. By comparison, the 
group of  rural-periphery municipalities accounts for only 4 percent of  the population, 
but 47 percent of  municipalities. 
Generally, it is possible to view the initiation of  change from two viewpoints: first, as 
a result of  the motives and actions of  rational actors, and second, as a result of  changes 
within the external environment (Lowndes & Roberts 2013). The emphasis on territo-
rial change during the 1950s and 60s, as well as in the early 1990s, may be traced back 
to such external influences. In the former era, Denmark, along with the other Nordic 
countries, was actively incorporating the local level into the welfare service system. The 
influence of  this is clearly visible in the discourse and arguments put forth in favour of  
territorial reforms (Eythórsson 2014). In the 1990s, the Icelandic government initiative 
was strongly influenced by the new public management wave, which was, at the time, 
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reaching its peak (Kristmundsson 2003). However, unlike the other Nordic countries, 
the window of  opportunity (Kingdon 2003) opened and closed again in Iceland without 
any major top-down territorial reforms being initiated. The same occurred during the 
government-initiated amalgamation election in 2005, although in this case the initiative 
was purely actor-driven, as it was not possible to identify any external influences at the 
time. 
Kingdon (2003) asserts that to open a policy window successfully, the three pro-
cess streams—problems, policies and politics—must intersect. Applying this rule to the 
Icelandic situation reveals a unique trend. First, the problem stream is present, and it 
emerges through the fact that during this time, there is always a group of  actors who 
view the situation as a problem and who actively seek a solution to the problem, usually 
by suggesting large-scale territorial reform. As the numerous reports and policy propos-
als on the issue of  territorial reforms in the past 40 years show, the second stream of  
policy proposals is present as well. Therefore, the main obstacle to territorial reforms 
lies within the political stream. 
The political stream includes the national mood, campaigns by pressure groups, po-
litical ideology and election results, as well as changes within the administration (King-
don 2003, 145). In the Icelandic context, it seems that pressure groups have not yet 
played a large part, leaving the main arena to political parties and local elites. Although 
Figure 1. The two main sources of political conflict in relation to territorial reforms 
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it is difficult to pinpoint any particular political ideology that is explicitly against ter-
ritorial reform, political parties have hesitated to openly suggest compulsory territorial 
reforms. The only party that has actively and openly argued for such a move is the Social 
Democratic Alliance (Samfylking), which is ideologically related to the Social Democrats 
who led the Ministry of  Local Government during the widespread attempt at amal-
gamation in 1993. The Social Democratic Alliance entered the ministry again in 2007 
and the minister openly suggested setting one-thousand-resident limits on municipali-
ties. However, these ideas were overshadowed by the financial crisis in 2008 and have 
not resurfaced since. The electoral base of  the parties that have been in power for the 
bulk of  this time—the Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkur) and the Progressive Party 
(Framsóknarflokkur)—is drawn from the periphery. Members of  parliament (MPs) repre-
senting these parties have usually been particularly careful not to mention compulsory 
amalgamation, although a notable exception is the Progressive Party minister of  local 
government in 2005. Furthermore, research has shown that MPs from the periphery, 
regardless of  their party origins, enjoy a much closer relationship with local elites than 
MPs from the capital area (Hlynsdóttir & Önnudóttir forthcoming). Therefore, changes 
within the parliamentary composition have not resulted in any major changes to territo-
rial structure. 
The final and probably most important issue is national mood (Kingdon 2003). The 
analysis reveals that the national mood traditionally leans strongly in favour of  local 
government autonomy. Consequently, political forces have not received the necessary 
public support to implement compulsory territorial reforms. Furthermore, in the cases 
of  top-down territorial initiatives, opponents have been quick to seek support in the 
rhetoric of  the centre–periphery cleavage, as well as the urban–rural divide. 
However, it is wrong to claim that there have been no changes at the local level, even 
though these changes have taken place much more slowly and incrementally than many 
would have preferred. The implementation of  functional reforms during this era has 
initiated territorial reforms driven from the bottom up. Furthermore, local authorities 
have not been as successful in blocking functional reforms as they have been in thwart-
ing territorial changes. Thus, it may be argued that the central government, at least to 
some extent, has reformed government on the local level over the past 25 years. 
6. Discussion
The findings of  this study show that Icelandic government structure at the local level 
has persisted on a path of  maintaining high autonomy and a large number of  small and 
densely populated municipalities since the establishment of  the current system in the 
late 19th century. All major attempts on behalf  of  the central government to initiate 
territorial reforms have been thwarted mainly by using the ideology of  the autonomous 
model (Kjellberg 1985, 1995) in relation to a mixture of  rhetoric based on the centre–
periphery cleavage on the one hand and the urban–rural divide on the other. Hence, the 
sources of  political conflict already established in the early 20th century are as alive and 
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well today as they were then. Consequently, the government has not been able to use 
openings in policy windows successfully due to a negative national mood, thereby result-
ing in a lack of  political resilience when it comes to territorial reforms.  
However, at the same time, and reminiscent of  the Nordic model, the government 
has successfully delegated important tasks to local governments, such as the provision 
of  primary education, planning and disability services and welfare services (Baldersheim 
et al. 2017). Unlike territorial reforms, it is difficult to apply the rhetoric of  political con-
flict that is embedded in the centre–periphery cleavage or the urban–rural divide to the 
ideology of  functional reforms. As a result, sceptical local authorities have not been able 
to stave off  the trend of  functional reform. This has led to a situation in which several 
municipalities, although only representing a small segment of  the overall population, 
have had serious difficulties fulfilling their obligation to provide welfare services. The 
use of  IMCs to solve this problem has shed light on efficiency problems and potential 
democratic deficiencies. 
It can be argued that in the past 25 years, the interpretation of  the role of  local 
authorities has gone from accepting them as relatively inert (insofar as providing wel-
fare services) to viewing them as active ‘participants in large spheres of  public activity’ 
(Kjellberg 1995, 49). At the same time, the traditional perception of  municipalities as 
ultra-autonomous becomes increasingly troublesome as it stands in direct conflict with 
the role of  local governments as service providers. As a result, it is likely that as the 
weaknesses of  the current system become more apparent to the public, the national 
mood surrounding compulsory amalgamation will shift. However, given the persistence 
of  the dependency path in the existing institutional situation, it may be some time until 
we experience a major break from the current system of  local government in Iceland. 
Notes
1 Sometimes referred to as the Scandinavian model.
2 For an informative overview of  different approaches, see Peters (2012) and Thelen (1999).
3 Although the number of  municipalities will be reduced to as few as 72 in the spring of  2018, the 
current number of  municipalities will be used for analytical purposes.
4 There is a heated debate in Iceland over what should be considered the periphery (landsbyggð). This 
analysis relies on the traditional view of  interpreting the Reykjavík capital area and its immediate 
suburbs as unique when compared to other parts of  the country. A more nuanced approach to 
distinguishing between different levels of  settlements outside the capital area is for example found 
in Vífill Karlssons PhD Thesis; Transportation improvement and interregional migration from 2012. The 
application of  the centre-periphery cleavage in this paper however, follows closely the example laid 
out by Baldersheim and Rose in their 2010 book on territorial reform in Europe, Territorial Choice.
5 ‘Urban’ as a concept lacks a precise definition within the literature on Icelandic local government. 
A recent definition put forth by the European Union sets the threshold for urbanisation at 5,000 
residents (Dijkstra & Poelman, 2014). However, in the Icelandic context, the level is set at 500 
residents because villages of  this size are more likely to offer a certain level of  services, e.g. shops, 
small businesses and centres of  public services, whereas villages with fewer residents are often more 




Autonomy or integration: Historical 
analysis of the debate on the purpose 
of Icelandic local self-government 
References
Administrative Act 37/1993 [Stjórnsýslulög] (1997). Alþingistíðindi vefútgáfa. Retrieved from https://
www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/1993037.html
Askim, J., Klausen, J.E., Vabo, S.I., and Bjurstrom, K. (2016). “What Causes Municipal Amalgamation 
Reform? Rational Explanations Meet Western European Experiences, 2004–2013”, in S. Kuhlmann 
and G. Bouckaert (eds.), Local Public Sector Reforms in Times of  Crisis: National Trajectories and Interna-
tional Comparisons (pp. 59–80). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Atlason, G. (2008). “Byggðastefna við Austurvöll og í dreifbýli”, Mbl.is. Retrieved from https://www.
mbl.is/greinasafn/grein/1191955/
Baldersheim, H., and Rose, L.E. (2010a). “Territorial Choice: Rescaling Governance in European 
States”, in H. Baldersheim and L.E. Rose (eds.), Territorial Choice: The Politics of  Boundaries and Borders 
(pp. 1–20). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Baldersheim, H., and Rose, L.E. (2010b). “The Staying Power of  the Norwegian Periphery”, in H. 
Baldersheim and L. E. Rose (eds.), Territorial Choice: The Politics of  Boundaries and Borders (pp. 80–100). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Baldersheim, H., and Rose, L.E. (2011). “Norway: The Decline of  Subnational Democracy?” in J. 
Loughlin, F. Hendriks, and A. Lidström (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of  Local and Regional Democracy in 
Europe (pp. 282–306). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baldersheim, H., Rose, L.E., and Sandberg, S. (2017). “Local and Regional Government in the Nordic 
Countries: Co-Operative Decentralization”, in O. Knutsen (ed.), The Nordic Models in Political Science: 
Challenged but Still Viable? (pp. 193–218). Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.
Birkisson, D.F. (2018). “Segir rökþrota Ásmund ala á tortryggni”, Fréttablaðið. Retrieved from https://
www.frettabladid.is/frettir/segir-roekrota-asmund-ala-a-tortryggni
Björnsson, K. (2014). “Hlutur sveitarfélaga í umfangi hins opinbera”, Samband íslenskra sveitarfélaga. Re-
trieved from http://www.samband.is/um-okkur/sjonarmid/nr/1977
Björnsson, L. (1972). Saga sveitarstjórnar á Íslandi síðara bindi. Reykjavík: Samband íslenskra sveitarfélaga.
Blom-Hansen, J. (2012). “Local Government in Denmark and the 2007 Municipal Reform”, in A. Moi-
sio (ed.), Rethinking Local Government: Essays on Municipal Reform (pp. 43–82). Helsinki: Government 
Institute for Economic Research. Vatt Publications, 61. Retrieved from https://www.yumpu.com/
en/document/view/51163338/61-rethinking-local-government-essays-on-municipal-reform-vatt
Blom-Hansen, J., Borge, L. E and Dahlberg, M. (2010). “Local Government in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden”, in A. Moisio (ed.), Local public sector in transition: A Nordic perspective (pp.63-154). Helsinki 
Government institute for Economic Research. Vatt Publications, 56. Retrieved from www.doria.fi/
bitstream/handle/10024/148891/j56.pdf?sequence=1
Collier, R.B., and Collier, D. (1991). Shaping the Political Arena. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dahl, R.A., and Tufte, E.R. (1973). Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Dijkstra, L., and Poelman, H. (2014). A Harmonised Definition of  Cities and Rural Areas: The New Degree 
of  Urbanisation (Regional Working Papers No. WP 01/2014). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/sources/docgener/work/2014_01_new_urban.pdf
Eythórsson, G.T. (1998). Kommunindelningspolitik i Island: Staten, kommunerna och folket om kommunsam-
manslagningar. Göteborg: Göteborg Universitet.
Eythórsson, G.T. (1999). “Iceland”, in B. Jacob, W. Linder, R. Nabholz, and C. Hierli (eds.), Democracy 
and Local Governance: Nine Empirical Studies (pp. 62-88). Bern: Institute of  Political Science, University 
of  Bern.
Eythórsson, G.T. (2014). “Sameining sveitarfélaga á Íslandi í 70 ár. Röksemdir sameiningarsinna og 
andstæðinga”, Icelandic Review of  Politics & Administration 10(1), 143–168. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.13177/irpa.a.2014.10.1.8
Freysteinsdóttir, F.J., and Jónsson, G. (2016). “Yfirfærsla á málaflokki fatlaðs fólks frá ríki til sveitar-
félaga: Með sérstakri áherslu á stærsta sveitarfélagið, Reykjavík”, Icelandic Review of  Politics & Admin-
istration 12(2), 443–466. DOI: http://doi.org/10.13177/irpa.a.2016.12.2.12
99Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
Goldsmith, M. (2010). “Central Control over Local Government - A Western European Comparison”, 
Local Government Studies 28(3), 37–41.
Goldsmith, M., and Larsen, H.O. (2004). “Local Political Leadership: Nordic Style”, International Journal 
of  Urban and Regional Research 28(1), 121–133.
Guðmundsson, B., and Eythórsson, G.T. (2013). “Vægi atkvæða og pólitískt jafnrétti”, Íslenska Þjóðfélagið 
4, 39–63.
Guðmundsson, J. (1943). “Var rétt að afnema ömtin”, Sveitarstjórnarmál 3(1), 4–15.
Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hlynsdóttir, E.M. (2002). “Áhrif  lýðræðisþátta á sameiningarferli í Skagafirði”, Sveitarstjórnarmál 3(62), 
32–34.
Hlynsdóttir, E.M. (2015). “Ordførermakt eller rådmannsmakt: Lokalpolitisk lederskap på Island”, in 
N. Aarsæther and K.H. Mikalsen (eds.), Lokalpolitisk lederskap i Norden (pp. 69–87). Oslo: Gyldendal 
Akademisk.
Hlynsdóttir, E.M. (2016a). “Administrative Capacity and Long-Term Policy Making at the Icelandic Lo-
cal Level”, Icelandic Review of  Politics & Administration 12(2), 237–258. DOI: http://doi.org/10.13177/
irpa.a.2016.12.2.3
Hlynsdóttir, E.M. (2016b). “Leading the Locality: Icelandic Local Government Leadership Dilemma”, 
Lex Localis 14(4), 807–826. DOI: http://doi.org/10.4335/14.4.807-826(2016)
Hlynsdóttir, E.M. (2016c). “Professionalism among Icelandic Mayors: Job Postings, Experience and 
Education as Determinants of  Professionalism at the Icelandic Local Level”, Icelandic Review of  Poli-
tics & Administration 12(1), 5-26. DOI: http://doi.org/10.13177/irpa.a.2016.12.1.1
Hlynsdóttir, E.M., and Önnudóttir, E.H. (forthcoming). “Constituency Service in Iceland and the Im-
portance of  the Centre–Periphery Divide”, Representation.
Information Act 50/1996 [Upplýsingalög] (1996). Alþingistíðindi vefútgáfa. Retrieved from https://
www.althingi.is/lagas/124/1995066.html
Jóhannesson, A.Þ., Jóhannesson, H., and Eythórsson, G.T. (2016). Samstarfsverkefni sveitarfélaga. Retrieved 
from https://www.rha.is/static/files/Rannsoknir/2016/samstarf_sveitarfelaga_lokaskyrsla.pdf
Keating, M. (1995). “Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and Public 
Choice”, in D. Judge, G. Stoker, and H. Wolman (eds.), Theories of  Urban Politics (pp. 117–134). 
London: Sage Publications.
Kingdon, J.W. (2003). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.
Kjellberg, F. (1985). “Local Government Reorganization and the Development of  the Welfare State”, 
Journal of  Public Policy 5(2), 215–239. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00003032
Kjellberg, F. (1995). “The Changing Values of  Local Government”, The Annals of  American Academy of  
Political and Social Science 540(1), 40–50.
Krasner, S. (1984). “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics”, Com-
parative Politics 16(2), 223–46.
Kristinsson, G.H. (2001). Staðbundin stjórnmál: Markmið og árangur sveitarfélaga. Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan.
Kristinsson, G.H. (2015). “Political Control and Perceptions of  Corruption in Icelandic Local Gov-
ernment”, Icelandic Review of  Politics & Administration 11(1), 1–18. DOI: http://doi.org/10.13177/
irpa.a.2015.11.1.1
Kristmundsson, Ó.H. (2003). Reinventing Government in Iceland: A Case Study of  Public Management Reform. 
Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan.
Kuhlmann, S., and Wollmann, H. (2014). Introduction to Comparative Public Administration: Administrative 
Systems and Reforms in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., and Baldersheim, H. (2015). Local Autonomy Index for European Countries (1990–
2014). Release 1.0. Brussels: European Commission.
Lidström, A. (2010). “The Swedish Model Under Stress: The Waning of  the Egalitarian, Unitary State?” 
in H. Baldersheim and L.E. Rose (eds.), Territorial Choice: The Politics of  Boundaries and Borders (pp. 




Autonomy or integration: Historical 
analysis of the debate on the purpose 
of Icelandic local self-government 
Local Government Act 138/2011 [Lög um sveitarstjórnir] (2011). Alþingistíðindi vefútgáfa. Retrieved 
from http://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2011138.html
Local Government Act 8/1986 [Lög um sveitarstjórnir] (1986). Alþingistíðindi vefútgáfa. Retrieved 
from http://www.althingi.is/lagas/139b/1998045.html
Local Government Act [Tilskipun um sveitarstjórn á Íslandi] (1872). Iceland: Tíðindi frá Alþingi 
Íslendinga. Fjórtánda þing. 1873 síðari partur.
Lowndes, V., and Roberts, M. (2013). Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mouritzen, P.E. (2010). “The Danish Revolution in Local Government”, in H. Baldersheim and L.E. 
Rose (eds.), Territorial Choice: The Politics of  Boundaries and Borders (pp. 21–41). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Newton, K. (1982). “Is Small Really So Beautiful? Is Big Really So Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, and De-
mocracy in Local Government”, Political Studies 30(2), 190–206.
Peters, B.G. (2012). Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism (3rd ed.). New York: 
Continuum.
Pierson, P. (2003). “Big, Slow-moving and Invisible: Macrosocial Process in the Study of  Comparative 
Politics”, in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences 
(pp. 177–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Planning and Land Use Act 73/1997 [Skipulags- og byggingarlög] (1997). Alþingistíðindi vefútgáfa. 
Retrieved from https://www.althingi.is/lagas/138b/1997073.html
Pollitt, C., and Bouckaert, G. (2011). Public Management Reforms (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Primary School Act 66/1995 [Lög um grunnskóla] (1995). Alþingistíðindi vefútgáfa. Retrieved from 
https://www.althingi.is/lagas/124/1995066.html
Rose, L.E., and Ståhlberg, K. (2005). “The Nordic Countries: “Still the Promised Land?” in B. Denters 
and L.E. Rose (eds.), Comparing Local Governance. Trends and Developments (pp. 83–99). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Rothstein, B. (1998). “Political Institutions - An Overview”, in R. E. Goodin and H.-D. Klingemann 
(eds.), A New Handbook for Political Science (pp. 133–166). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sandberg, S. (2010). “Finnish Power-Shift: The Defeat of  the Periphery?”, in H. Baldersheim and L.E. 
Rose (eds.), Territorial Choice: The Politics of  Boundaries and Borders (pp. 42–60). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Sellers, J.M., and Lidström, A. (2007). “Decentralization, Local Government, and the Welfare State”, 
Governance 20(4), 609–632. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00374.x
Sharpe, L.J. (1970). “Theories and Values of  Local Government”, Political Studies 18(2), 153–174.
Sigurðsson, J.T. (2000). “Sjálfstjórn sveitarfélaga”, Úlfljótur 53(2), 143–189.
Statistics Iceland. (2015). “Local Government Elections 31 May 2014”, Hagtíðindi, (November), 1–48. 
Thelen, K. (1999). “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of  Political Sci-
en(1), 369–404. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369
Tilskipun um sveitarstjórn á Íslandi. (1872). Tíðindi frá Alþingi Íslendinga. Fjórtánda þing. Síðari partur. 
Valen, H., Narud, H.M., and Harðarson, Ó.T. (2000). “Geography and Political Representation”, in P. 
Esaiasson and K. Heidar (eds.), Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience (pp. 107–131). Colum-
bus: Ohio State University Press.
Valsson, T.F. (2014). Sveitarstjórnarréttur. Reykjavík: Codex.
Vetter, A., and Kersting, N. (2003). “Democracy versus Efficiency? Comparing Local Government 
Reforms Across Europe”, in N. Kersting and A. Vetter (eds.), Reforming Local Government in Europe: 
Closing the Gap between Democracy and Efficiency (pp. 11–28). Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
Wollmann, H. (2004). “Urban Leadership in German Local Politics: The Rise, Role and Performance 
of  the Directly Elected (Chief  Executive) Mayor”, International Journal of  Urban and Regional Research 
28(March), 150–165.
